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DRUNK DRIVERS VERSUS IMPLIED CONSENT:
A SOBERING NEW ILLINOIS STATUTE
In 1966, the federal government enacted the National Highway Safety Act to develop safety plans and reduce accidents,
deaths, and injuries.1 Although the Act itself did not refer to
drunk drivers or implied consent laws, the Secretary of Transportation issued a regulation requiring each state to develop a
program to reduce alcohol related accidents. 2 Implied consent
statutes are an important part of these programs.
The premise of an implied consent statute is as follows:
when a driver obtains the privilege of driving within a state, evidenced by the issuance of a driver's license, he gives his consent
to the performance of chemical tests to determine his blood alcohol level if he is arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI).3
A chemical analysis of the blood, breath, or urine which indicates a blood alcohol level of .10% or higher creates a presump4
tion of intoxication.
1. In pertinent part, the National Highway Safety Act, 23 U.S.C.
§ 403(a) (1970), states:
Each state -hall have a highway safety program approved by the Secretary, designed to reduce traffic accidents and deaths, injuries, and property damage resulting therefrom. Such programs shall be in
accordance with uniform standards promulgated by the Secretary.
Such uniform standards shall be expressed in terms of performance criteria. Such uniform standards shall be promulgated by the Secretary
so as to improve ,driver performance . . . and to improve pedestrian
performance.
2. Highway Safety Program Standard No. 8, Alcohol in Relation to
Highway Safety, 23 C.F.R. § 204.4-8 (1971), which reads in pertinent part:
Each State, in cooperation with its political subdivisions, shall develop
and implement a program to achieve a reduction in those traffic accidents arising in whole or in part from persons driving under the influence of alcohol. The program shall provide at least that:
I. There is a specification by the Senate of the following offenses:
A. Chemical test procedures for determining blood alcohol concentrations.
B. (1) The blood-alcohol concentrations, not higher than .10 percent by weight, which define the terms "intoxicated" or "under the influence of alcohol," and (2) A provision making it either unlawful, or
presumptive evidence of illegality, if the blood-alcohol concentration of
a driver equals or exceeds the limit so established.
II. Any person placed under arrest for operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol is deemed to have
given his consent to a chemical test of his blood, breath, or urine for the
purpose of determining the alcohol content of his blood.

3. 23 C.F.R. § 204.4 (1971).
4. Id. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Illinois passed its first implied consent statute in 1972. 5 In
1981 that law was completely revised and expanded. 6 This comment will examine the new statute, discuss likely constitutional
challenges, and consider whether the statute can withstand
such challenges. To fully understand the impact of this statute,
an examination of the old statute is necessary.

THE 1972 ILLINOIS IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE
The original Illinois implied consent statute can be distinguished from the present statute in several aspects. First, it allowed only for analysis of the breath to determine a driver's
blood alcohol level. Although a driver impliedly consented to
such a test, actual consent had to be obtained by the arresting
officer. 7 Second, a refusal to take the test resulted in a suspension of driving privileges for a period of three months for the
first refusal and for six months for each subsequent refusal
within a five year period.8
Additionally, the old statute contained a number of features
designed to protect the rights of the accused. First, a suspect
had to have been placed under lawful arrest prior to administration of any tests. Further, a suspect was to be informed of the
consequences of a refusal to be tested and was given a 90 minute
time period in which to consult with an attorney and make a
decision whether to refuse the test. During testing, two breath
tests were given to ensure that the breathalizer was working although an accused could refuse the second test after seeing the
results of the first. As a result, neither the initial test nor any
test refusal could be used as evidence in any criminal or civil
matter. After testing, the accused could obtain additional tests
on his own. The accused was also entitled to a hearing before a
final suspension of his driving privileges. Finally, an unconscious or dead person was deemed to have withdrawn his consent to any form of blood alcohol testing.9
Comparison of implied consent statutes of neighboring
states indicates the uniqueness of the original Illinois statute.
The surrounding states of Indiana, 10 Iowa," Michigan, 12 and
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95

1/2, § 11-501.1 (1979).

6. An Act of August 20th, 1981, P.A. No. 82-311, § 11-501--11-501.2
(amending ch. 95 1/2, § 11-501--11-501.1 (1979) (hereinafter cited as P.A. No.

82-311 (1981).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 11-501.1(a) (1979).
8. Id. at § 11-501.1(a) (2).
9. Id.

10. IND. CODE ANN. § 9-4-4.5-1 (Burns 1971 & Supp. 1980).
11. IOWA CODE ANN. § 321B.3 (West 1966 &Supp. 1981).
12. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2325(1) (Callaghan 1981).
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Wisconsin 13 do not require a 90 minute waiting period in which
an accused can decide to take the test or consult with an attorney. 14 Iowa requires that any test be given within two hours of
6
arrest. 15 Indiana and Wisconsin provide for pre-arrest tests.'
No surrounding state requires that two tests be given after arrest. 17 Wisconsin provides for a test after arrest as well as prior
to arrest, but evidence of the pre-arrest test is not admissible at
trial. 18 While Illinois allowed only for breath testing,19 implied
consent statutes of the surrounding states permit blood and
urine tests.20 All of the statutes provide for some sort of hearing
with regard
to the suspension or revocation of driving
21
privileges.
THE

1981

ILLINOIS IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE

The new implied consent statute enacted by the Illinois legislature in August 1981 more closely resembles the statutes of
the states surrounding Illinois than does the 1972 statute. Many
of the provisions of the original statute are deleted or modified.
An additional paragraph contains several new or modified provisions 2 2 which set out the types of tests permissible for determin13. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 343.305 (West Supp. 1981).
14. See supra notes 10-13.

15. "[A] peace officer shall determine which of the four substances,

If such Peace officer fails
breath, blood, saliva or urine, shall be tested ....
to provide a test within two hours after such arrest, no test shall be required, and there shall be no revocation under the provisions of section
321B.7." IOWA CODE ANN. § 321B.3 (West Supp. 1980).
16. Any person who drives or operates a motor vehicle upon the public
highways of this state .

.

. shall be deemed to have given his consent to

tests of his or her breath, blood or urine ... any such test shall be administered upon the request of a law enforcement officer. A law enforcement
officer may administer a preliminary breath test. WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 343.305(2) (a) (West Supp. 1980).
Any law enforcement officer authorized to enforce the laws of this state
regulating the use and operation of vehicles on public highways who
has probable cause to believe that any person has committed the offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated ... shall not place such
person under arrest for such offense until he has first offered to such
person the opportunity to submit to a chemical test.
IND. CODE ANN. § 9-4-4.5-3 (Burns Supp. 1980).
17. See supra notes 10-13.
18. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343.305(2) (a) (West Supp. 1980). ("Neither the results of the preliminary test nor the fact that it was administered shall be
admissable in any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that
the person was under the influence of an intoxicant.").
19. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 11-501.1 (1979).
20. IND. CODE ANN. § 9-4-4.5.2 (Burns 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 3218.3
(West Supp. 1980); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2325(3) (Callaghan 1981); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 343.305(1) (West Supp. 1980).
21. See supra notes 17-20.
22. P.A. No. 82-311, § 11-501.2 (1981).
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ing blood alcohol levels. While the old statute allowed only for
breath tests, 23 the new law permits not only breath tests but also
blood and urine tests. 24 A physician or nurse must perform the

blood test.25 Moreover, evidence of a refusal to submit to testing
may be used at any civil or criminal proceeding. 26 This is a major reversal of the old statute which allowed such evidence only
at presuspension hearings.
Other changes have also been made within section 11-501.1
of the original implied consent section. The 90-minute waiting
period in which to consent and/or consult with an attorney has
been eliminated.27 Only one test of the breath, blood, or urine is
now required; 28 thus, there is no longer any chance to refuse to
be tested after seeing the results of the first test.29 In another
major change, a dead or unconscious person is deemed not to
have withdrawn his consent to be tested for blood alcohol
30
concentration.
Several of the provisions meant to protect the rights of the
accused still remain in force. Officers still must inform arrestees
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 11-501.1(a) (1979).
24. P.A. No. 82-311, § 11-501.2(a) (1981).
25. Id. at § 11-501.2(a)(2). It is important from a constitutional standpoint that the new statute calls for a physician or nurse to take the blood
test if that test is utilized by a police agency. The fact that such a bodily
invasion by needle will be done by trained medical personnel under sterile
conditions should weaken any constitutional attacks on the law based on
unreasonable search. For a further discussion of blood tests and fourth
amendment protection against unreasonable search, see infra note 74.

26. P.A. No. 82-311, § 11-501.2(c) (1981).
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/21 § 11-501.1(a) (2) (1979).
28. Id.at § 11-501.1(a)(1) (1979).
29. This is one of the strengths of the new statute. Under the old statute
a refusal to take the second of the two breath tests was taken as a complete
refusal to be tested. The first test was inadmissable as evidence. This allowed an arrested driver to take the first test and then, depending on its
result, either continue with the second test or refuse further testing. Thus,
if the first test was high and a refusal made to the second test, a valuable
and sometimes vital piece of evidence was lost to the prosecution.
30. As with many of the changes in the new law, this particular change
has long been called for by law enforcement agencies. Under the old implied consent statute, many drivers escaped punishment under the criminal
law for injuries or deaths they caused by driving drunk. Although the blood
alcohol test is not required to convict under implied consent, convictions
without such tests are based on visual observations made of the driver such
as his manner of speech, his ability to walk, and his ability to communicate
with the arresting officer. In the case of a dead or unconscious person, the
only basis for conviction may well be the result of blood alcohol tests.
Under the new law, the dead or unconscious driver has given his consent to
such tests. In the long run this will result in the removal of more drunk
drivers from the roadways and will ensure punishment of those who kill or
maim while driving drunk. For a discussion of this aspect of the new implied consent statute, see Whelan, Driving Under the Influence ofAlcohol: A
New Law for the State of Illinois, N.W. SuB., BA.J., Dec. 1981, at 7. See also

P.A. No. 82-311, § 11-501.1(b).
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of the consequences of a refusal to be tested. 31 Also, both the
right to a presuspension hearing and the right to secure additional, independent blood alcohol tests remain as provisions of
the new statute. 32 The new statute does delete a number of provisions which affirmatively protected the rights of the accused.
Although these deletions are likely to raise constitutional questions, the assumption should not be made that the new statute
fails to protect the accused's rights or that it cannot withstand
constitutional attacks. What the statute does not do is protect
these rights with any greater force than the minimum constitutional guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court.
IMPLIED CONSENT AND THE CoNsTrruION

Constitutional attacks on implied consent statutes focus on
fourteenth amendment due process and fifth amendment protections from self-incrimination. The statutes have also been
challenged on the basis of equal protection, fourth amendment
search and seizure, sixth amendment right to counsel, and admission of evidence of refusal.
Due Process
The first case to question the constitutionality of an implied
consent statute was Schutt v. MacDuff,33 which challenged the

first such state enactment. 34 The New York statute was struck
down on two due process issues: failure to require that a lawful
arrest take place prior to requesting a test, and failure to provide
for an administrative hearing prior to the revocation of the
driver's license. 35 The court found that the statute allowed a
31. P.A. No. 82-311, § 11-501.1(c) (1981). The penalties for refusal have
been increased to a six month suspension for an initial refusal to be tested
and to one year for a subsequent refusal within five years.
32. PA No. 82-311, § 11-501.1(c) (1981).
33. 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
34. See 1953 N.Y. LAws ch. 854, § 1 (current version at N. Y. VEH. &TRAF.
LAw § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979)).
The original statute was passed prior to the National Highway Safety
Act. It read in pertinent part:

CHEMICAL TESTS. 1. Any person who operates a motor vehicle or

motorcycle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a
chemical test of his breath, blood, urine or saliva for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood provided that such test is
administered at the direction of a police officer having reasonable
grounds to suspect such person of driving in an intoxicated condition.
If such person refuses to submit to such chemical test the test shall not
be given but the commissioner shall revoke his license or permit to
drive and any non-resident driving privileges.
35. Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 52-53, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116, 126-27 (Sup.
Ct. 1954). Schutt had been arrested for driving while intoxicated and was

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 15:479

driver to be stopped and restrained without process or lawful
arrest, and forced the driver to accompany the officer and submit to a blood test.3 6 Due process protections were also found
lacking in the revocation of the driver's license for refusal to
solely on hearsay
take a test since such revocation was "based
37
without any other hearing or testimony.
In contrast, the United States District Court in 1978 upheld a
provision of the North Carolina implied consent statute which
allowed a notice of revocation to be issued prior to any revocation hearing.3 8 The distinguishing factor between this statute
and others which have been found unconstitutional was that,
here, revocation was not automatic; rather, it was held in abeyfor a hearing was made after receipt of
ance if a written request
39
the revocation notice.
The United States Supreme Court examined the question of
presuspension hearings in Mackey v. Montrym,40 balancing the
taken to the police station where he was asked to submit to a blood test. He
refused and his driver's license was subsequently revoked. Id. at 45, 127
N.Y.S.2d at 120.
36. Id. The concern of the court was that under the statute as written, a
police officer could stop, detain, and force a driver to submit to chemical
tests without the officer even arresting the driver by either warrant or lawful arrest arising out of an act committed within the officer's presence. The
practice of "stop and frisk" for weapons absent a lawful arrest when an officer has reasonable grounds to believe a person is armed was upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The practice of detaining a person while chemical tests are performed on him, however, has never been sanctioned without prior lawful arrest.
37. 205 Misc. at 55, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 128. In 1954 the New York statute was
amended to correct the deficiencies noted by the court. 1954 N.Y. LAws ch.
320, § 1 (amending 1953 N.Y. LAws ch. 854, § 1).
After the amendment of the New York statute, a second constitutional
attack was made in Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257
(Sup. Ct. 1954). The statute as amended withstood this constitutional attack. Since that time the United States Supreme Court has declared that
suspension of a driver's license is a state action adjudicating important interests that are not to be taken away without due process required by the
fourteenth amendment. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
38. Montgomery v. North Carolina, 455 F. Supp. 338, 341 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
39. Id. See Slone v. Kentucky Dep't. of Transp., 379 F. Supp. 652 (E.D.
Ky. 1974), where the court found Kentucky's implied consent statute unconstitutional because it allowed for revocation of the driver's license prior to
any hearing. Further, the statute did not allow for suspension of the revocation pending a requested hearing.
40. 443 U.S. 1 (1979). A Massachusetts statute allowed for a hearing on
the suspension of a driver's license for refusal to submit to a breathalizer
test, but only after the license was surrendered. A decision from the hearing officer could usually be had in one or two days following the driver's
receipt of the suspension notice but in no event later than 10 days. The
court did not find any undue harm in the suspension prior to hearing. 443
U.S. at 9 n.5.
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interests of the accused against the interests of the state. 41 The
state's interest in the expeditious removal of drunk drivers from
the highway outweighed any interest the driver had in keeping
his privilege to drive until after the hearing.42 Mackey should,
therefore, dispel any fears that the new Illinois statute might be
struck down for failure to provide due process in the suspension
of the driver's license for refusal to be tested. The Illinois statute provides that once a notice of suspension is received, the
43
driver has twenty-eight days to request a suspension hearing,
well within the ambit of Mackey.4 Thus, the new Illinois implied consent statute's provisions for license suspension do not
violate an accused's rights to due process of the law.
The Fifth Amendment
Fifth amendment attacks have struck at the very heart of
implied consent statutes. The attackers contend that because
41. The balancing test was devised in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), which balanced the private interest protected against the interests
of the state. Mathews dealt with the question whether the due process
clause of the fifth amendment required that an evidentiary hearing precede
termination of Social Security disability benefits. In weighing the interests,
the Court considered the fiscal and administrative burdens versus the countervailing private interests. The Court found that the essence of due process was the requirement that a person in jeopardy of serious loss be given
notice of the case against him and the opportunity to meet it. In deciding if
this requirement had been met, the Court found it necessary to determine
when the Constitution required that judicial type proceedings be imposed
upon administrative action to assure fairness. This determination was to be
made by balancing the state interest against the private interest. 424 U.S.
319.
42. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 19 (1979). The Court felt that the risk
of erroneous observation or deliberate misrepresentation of the facts by the
arresting officer was slight in comparison to the state's substantial interest.
The state's substantial interest was based on its police function in protecting the safety of its people by preserving the safety of its public highways.
The Court recognized that this interest would be seriously undermined if
an accused were allowed to continue driving pending a presuspension
hearing.
43. P.A. No. 82-311, § 11-501.1(c) (1981).
44. This is especially true in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977), where the Illinois Driver Licensing Law
was upheld. That law provides for suspension or revocation of a driver's
license without prior hearing where the driver's record indicates an inability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle. As in Mackey, the Court found that the public interest in safety on
the roads and highways was sufficiently weighty for the state to make its
summary initial decision effective without a predecision administrative
hearing. Id. at 115.
In Holland v. Parker, 354 F. Supp. 196 (D.S.D. 1973), a South Dakota
implied consent statute provided that an arrest, not specifically a lawful arrest, be made before a request to take the test was given. The court reiterated the need for a lawful arrest prior to testing and struck down the South
Dakota law as unconstitutional.
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refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test results in the suspension or revocation of driving privileges, an accused is forced to
forfeit his right against self-incrimination in order to keep his
privilege to drive. This privilege to drive is also viewed as a
right on a par with the right against self-incrimination. 45
The landmark decision of Schmerber v. California46 has
helped to defeat these claims. Though Schmerber did not involve implied consent, it dealt with the withdrawal of blood for
evidentiary purposes. The Court found that the fifth amendment protected only testimonial or communicative evidence.
Evidence of a physical nature, although obtained by compulsion, was not violative of protections against self-incrimination.47 Schmerber dealt only with blood tests. Implied consent
statutes permitting breath and urine tests, should find Schmerber applicable with little difficulty.48
In Bailey v. City of Tulsa,49 an Oklahoma court noted the
Schmerber findings in upholding an implied consent statute and
its authorization of breath tests. The Oklahoma constitution's
prohibition against self-incrimination was broader in scope than
45. "[A] basic distinction [has been] made between "rights" and "privileges"......

[R]ights involved things government did to people, while privi-

leges involved things government did for people. Rights could not be
abridged without fundamental fair procedures... privileges could be given
or taken away on the terms set by the government." W. COHEN, J. KAPLAN,
BILL OF RIGHTS, 751 (1976) (emphasis added).
There can be little doubt that the "right" to drive must be considered a
privilege and not a fundamental right such as the right against self-incrimination. Fundamental rights are those rights embodied in the Bill of Rights
and certain other rights which are deemed part of the very essence of life in
a free nation. The legal privilege to drive is one bestowed by the State
which can be taken away by the State. It must be recognized that driving is
an important privilege that may in fact be essential to the holder's livelihood. This recognition of importance, however, does not make the privilege
a fundamental right under the Constitution. See Wells v. Malloy, 402 F.
Supp. 856, 858 (D. Vt. 1975).
46. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Schmerber was arrested for driving a vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor. Upon advice of counsel
he objected to the taking of a blood sample. The blood sample was taken
over his objection and was used as evidence in obtaining his conviction.
47. Id. The fifth amendment protects a person from being compelled
"to be a witness against himself." This protection has been consistently interpreted as preventing compulsion to give oral trial testimony or make oral
statements prior to trial which would tend to incriminate. The chemical
make-up or physical attributes of a person do not fall under the same protections as oral statements.
48. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266 (1967); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221 (1967) (Schmerber cited as authority for finding that
self-incrimination protections do not extend to handwriting exemplars, participation in lineups, submission to fingerpainting, photography, or
measurements).
49. 491 P.2d 316 (Okla. Crim. 1971).
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the federal and was not limited to testimonial evidence. 50 The
court also noted that no criminal consequences evolved from refusal to take a test and concluded that there was no forced forfeiture of one right in order to keep another since operation of a
motor vehicle was a privilege and not a right. 5' Finally, the court
stated that where a test was taken, there was a knowing waiver
52
of the state self-incrimination right.

Thus, case law on the subject suggests that blood alcohol
tests do not violate fifth amendment rights. Since Schmerber
would likely be extended beyond blood tests, 53 the tests pro-

vided by the new Illinois statute do not bring it into conflict with
the United States Constitution. The remaining question is
whether the statute violates the Illinois Constitution.
The situation in Illinois is similar to that faced by the
Oklahoma court in Bailey. Article I, section 10, of the Illinois
Constitution protects against self-incrimination and double
jeopardy.54 The wording of section 10, however, differs from that
of the fifth amendment. While the fifth amendment protects a
person from "being a witness against himself," 55 the Illinois
Constitution protects a person from giving "evidence against
himself." Like Bailey, the language of the Illinois Constitution
is broader than the federal and might be interpreted to prevent
5
blood alcohol tests.

6

50. Id. at 318. "No person shall be compelled to give evidence which will
tend to incriminate him." OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 21.
51. 491 P.2d at 319. See supra note 45.
52. Id. For a further discussion of waiver, see J. KLOTrER & J. KANovrrz,
CONSTrruTIONAL LAW FOR POLICE, §§ 7.6--7.7 (3d ed. 1977) (a defendant
claims his privilege either by not speaking or by not taking the stand at
trial: where the defendant chooses to waive his right, the prosecution must
show that there was a knowing and intelligent waiver).
53. See supra note 48. Extension of the Schmerber findings to breath
and urine tests is a logical step. Like blood, breath and urine are bodily
products. No oral statements are needed either to take or to analyze a specimen of breath or urine. Logic, therefore, dictates that such tests do not fall
under fifth amendment protections.
54. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10. "No person shall be compelled in a criminal
case to give evidence against himself nor be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense."
55. "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
56. The term "evidence" is an all inclusive one taking in all means by
which an alleged matter is proved. A "witness" gives evidence in the form
of oral testimony. A witness and his testimony become part of the broader
concept of evidence in a criminal or civil action. The fifth amendment protection from compulsion to be a witness against oneself is, therefore, a narrower concept than a protection from compulsion to give any evidence,
testimonial or not. Since the Illinois Constitution uses the broader term a
strong argument could be made that the Il1inois Constitution affords
broader protection than the fifth amendment.
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This does not mean that the newly adopted implied consent
statute is invalid under the Illinois Constitution. If confronted
with the issue, the Illinois courts would attempt to construe the
law in a way that would make it constitutional.5 7 In that case,
the interpretation made by the Bailey court may be applicable.
Specifically, nothing within the Illinois statute compels a
driver to give evidence against himself in the form of a blood
test. He is free to refuse the test, and if he does refuse, no criminal sanctions attach. Also, the right against self-incrimination
can be knowingly waived.58 In an implied consent situation, it
must be shown that the accused knew the consequences of his
decision to waive his right against self-incrimination. Since the
Illinois statute requires the arresting officer to inform the accused of the consequences of his refusal to be tested, the accused can make a knowing decision on whether to waive his
self-incrimination right.5 9 This will protect the statute from fifth
60
amendment and Illinois constitutional attacks.
Equal Protection
Claims based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment have not been as prevalent as due process
claims in challenges to implied consent statutes. 6 1 The issue
57. An Illinois court would utilize the method used at the federal level
for finding a statute valid under the constitution, i.e., a narrow interpretation of the statute so that it would fall within constitutional limits. The
method is used to keep the court from direct conflict with the legislature on
questions of constitutional interpretation. See Bailey v. Tulsa, 491 P.2d 316
(Okla. Crim. 1971).
The question whether a blood alcohol test under implied consent violates the Illinois Constitution has never been examined directly by the Illinois Supreme Court. Its past interpretations of matters falling under art. I,
§ 10, however, indicate that no violation would be found and that the Illinois

court would follow the findings of the U.S. Supreme Court with regard to
fifth amendment rights. See People v. Kennedy, 33 Ill. App. 3d 857, 338
N.E.2d 414 (1975) (giving voice samples does not constitute self-incrimination). See also People v. Schmoll, 77 Ill. App. 3d 762, 396 N.E.2d 634 (1979),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980) (§ 10 does not impose higher standard than
fifth amendment).
58. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
59. See Bailey v. Tulsa, 491 P.2d 316 (Okla. Crim. 1971). (by electing to
take a breathalizer the defendant knowingly waives the self-incrimination
privilege).
60. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (discussion on voluntary waiver and its requirement that such waiver must merely be free from duress or coercion to
be valid).
61. Equal protection claims are based on the idea that implied consent
statutes arbitrarily single out drivers and subject them to penalties such as
suspension or revocation of driving privileges in violation of equal protection of the law. For further discussion on this point, see Pepin v. Dept. of
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was raised in the Schutt 62 case but was rejected by the New

York court. The court there found that the essence of the right
to equal protection of the law was that all persons similarly situated be treated alike. 63 New York's statute treated equally all
persons similarly situated; since all drivers were affected by the
statute in the same way, 64 there was no violation of equal protection rights.
The equal protection claim was again rejected in Wells v.
Malloy,65 where a United States District Court in Vermont concluded that driving was not a fundamental right. 66 The court
held that the strict scrutiny test of equal protection did not apply to nonfundamental rights; 67 thus the Vermont statute could
Motor Vehicles, 275 Cal. App. 2d 9, 79 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1969); Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
62. Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
63. Id. at 51, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 125.
64. Id. The fact that the law did not apply to unlicensed citizens was
immaterial from a constitutional standpoint, since the licensed driver
stands in a separate class and is subject to legislation specifically applying

to that class.
65. 402 F. Supp. 856 (D. Vt. 1975) (suit was brought challenging the con-

stitutionality of a Vermont statute which provided for a suspension of driving privileges of persons who failed to pay automobile purchase and use
taxes).
66. The privilege of driving was not considered a fundamental right. De-

nial of the privilege did not deny the defendant freedom of movement or
travel although such travel might be more difficult. See supra note 52 for
further discussion of fundamental rights.
67. Wells v. Malloy, 402 F. Supp. 856, 858 (D. Vt. 1975). The District
Court did not see any problem between its decision and the Supreme
Court's finding in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), that the right to drive
cannot be taken away without procedural due process. The district court

saw a distinction between the right to drive and fundamental rights which
are protected from suspect classifications based on race, nationality or
alienage.

For a complete discussion of equal protection, see L. TRIBE,

AMERICAN

CoNsrrtmoNAL LAw (1978). Tribe notes that two types of equal protection

exist: the right to equal treatment and the right to treatment as an equal.
The right to equal treatment is limited to a group of interests such as voting
rights. It requires that each person have equal access to the interest involved. This standard does not apply to all interests; the right to drive is
one such interest, since not every person is entitled to drive. The right to
treatment as an equal, however, does apply to all interests and requires that
the government treat each individual with equal regard as a person.
In balancing interests under equal protection, the classification in ques-

tion must be rational in regard to the class singled out. These classifications must be reasonable in light of the intended purpose of the law. Under
this analysis, a law which fails to include all who are similarly situated with
regard to the law may tip the balance toward private interests, making the
law unconstitutional. An implied consent statute which did not apply
equally to all drivers would be such a statute. Only in cases where burdens
are made on fundamental rights or with an apparent prejudice against racial or other minorities must the concept of strict scrutiny be applied to
preserve equality and liberty. Where a right is considered fundamental, inequalities in classification will be allowed only upon a showing of a compel-
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not be declared unconstitutional. The strict test of equal protection applies only to fundamental rights. For nonfundamental
rights, the test to be applied is whether the statute bears a rational relationship to the state interest. The need to remove
drunk drivers from the highways provides such a relationship. 68
The Illinois statute should withstand equal protection constitutional attack. Not only does the statute apply equally to all
drivers, but it also bears a rational relationship to state interest.
Additionally, the statute provides for due process protection for
all those arrested under it.
Search and Seizure

The earliest attack on implied consent statutes based on
fourth amendment rights 69 came in Schutt v. MacDuff.70 Schutt
contended that a blood alcohol test was an unreasonable search
prohibited by the fourth amendment. The New York court rejected this position, finding the "search" to be a reasonable
search incident to arrest. 71 Fourth amendment rights were also
a major factor in Shmerber v. California.72 There, the Supreme

Court found that blood tests were not unreasonable searches
and could be taken without any form of consent. 73 These points
ling governmental justification. L. TRIBE,

AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIoNAL LAW,

§§ 16-1-16-7 (1978).
68. The state interest is to provide safe highways for all Illinois citizens,
be they drivers or otherwise. Removing drunk drivers from the highways is
one means of protecting highway users. Implied consent provides the most
reasonable means of removing those drunk drivers, providing fair warning
of the consequences should a driver decide to drink and drive and applying
sanctions to those who fail to heed the warning. See Vermillion County v.
Lenover, 43 Ill. 2d 209, 251 N.E.2d 175 (1969) (guidelines for legislative classifications under the Illinois Constitution).
69. "The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.' U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
70. 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
71. Id. (the petitioner, being under lawful arrest, could be searched for

evidence of the crime for which he was arrested). Attacks on implied consent statutes based on the fourth amendment contend that obtaining bodily
fluids for blood alcohol testing constitute an unreasonable search. The taking of a blood sample is especially open to such attack since it involves an
actual intrusion into the body. The Schutt court looked at the blood test as
a search incident to a lawful arrest. On that basis it found the search
outside the fourth amendment protections from unreasonable searches
since it interpreted the amendment to protect only against warrantless
searches or searches made without lawful arrest.
72. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
73. The Schmerber court regarded the blood test as a fourth amendment
search. Id. at 767-70. Since the decision, a number of courts have interpreted Schmerber to allow states to freely compel drivers to submit to
chemical tests for intoxication with or without a lawful arrest. See, e.g.,
State v. Mitchell, 245 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1971) (blood tests may be taken in cer-
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become important factors when considering the new statute's
permissiveness on testing dead or unconscious persons.
The new Illinois statute, 74 in contrast to the old statute, 75
provides that dead or unconscious persons have not withdrawn
their consent to be tested. Since Schmerber held that blood
tests are not unreasonable searches, the position taken on dead
or unconscious persons by the new statute is not constitutionally prohibited. Consent is not required for the testing so long
as it is reasonable. 76 Thus, the new Illinois implied consent statute does not violate an accused's fourth amendment rights.
tain cases without arrest); State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970) (there
is a clear legal right to require a blood-alcohol test).
The Schmerber decision also acted to remove some of the doubt cast by
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), with regard to searches below the
skin. The Rochin Court found that a search of the stomach was a violation
of due process and that it was similar to a coerced confession. Id. at 173.
Although the Schmerber Court found the blood test to be a fourth amendment search, it found that the search was reasonable. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769 (1966). Consent was not required and the failure to
obtain a search warrant was excused because alcohol content subsides
quickly after the suspect stops drinking, thus creating exigent circumstances. Id. at 770-71.
One note of importance is that the Schmerber court rejected the stance
taken by the New York court in Schutt finding that blood tests could not be
justified merely as incident to a lawful arrest. Id. at 769-70. Tribe has noted
that although certain compulsory intrusions of the body have been upheld,
the matters have been taken with enough seriousness to require that the
government provide more than the minimal justification for the action. He
outlines four factors which may lead to a finding of an unlawful search: "1)
that the imposition was deficient in procedural regularity, or 2) that it was
needlessly severe, or 3) that it was too novel, or 4) that it was lacking in a
fair measure of reciprocity." L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUIONAL LAw, § 159 (1978).
Thus, full searches of the person are valid when made incident to a lawful arrest. Waiver of fourth amendment rights and consent to a search may
also be obtained. Where consent is sought, the waiver of fourth amendment
rights must be voluntary and must be given by a person having the capacity

to consent. See J. KLOTTER, J. KANovTrz,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw FOR POLICE,

§§ 4.8-4.9 (3d ed. 1977). See also Lerblance, Implied Consent to Intoxication
Tests: a Flawed Concept, 53 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 39 (1978) which points out
that the "knowing and intelligent waiver" standard applies to trial rights
and that a standard of "voluntary waiver" applies to other rights. This article also provides an excellent discussion of the capacity of an intoxicated
person to consent to a blood-alcohol test. Id. at 49-60.
74. P.A. No. 82-311, § 11-501.1(b) (1981).
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 11.501.1(e) (1979). See supra note 30 and

accompanying text.
76. Prior to its holding in Schmerber, the Supreme Court, in Briethaupt
v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), found that a blood test conducted on an unconscious driver did not violate fourteenth amendment due process.
Briethaupt was distinguished from Rochin in that a blood test was found to

be a minor intrusion of the body to which many people voluntarily subjected themselves daily.
Two concepts converge in an implied consent statute. There is the idea
that no consent need be obtained to take a blood-alcohol test where such
test is incident to a lawful arrest. By this theory, implied consent statutes
could be written making blood-alcohol tests mandatory for all persons ar-
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Right to Counsel
Another major change in the new Illinois statute is the deletion of the 90 minute waiting period during which an accused
may consult with his attorney. Although the new statute does
not specifically deny the accused contact with his attorney, it is
silent on this point.7 7 The old statute required an arresting officer to inform the accused that he could consult with an attorney.7 8 The question whether implied consent is reached by the
sixth amendment right to counsel has never been addressed by
the Supreme Court. 79 Cases regarding the right to counsel do
not clearly indicate which way the Court would go on this
issue. 80

rested for driving while intoxicated. The wording of statutes such as the
one in Illinois, however, do not make these tests mandatory. If the view is
taken that the tests are searches, then the statutes treat them not as
searches incident to a lawful arrest but as those taken upon consent to a
waiver of rights. Consent would not be obtained for a search incident to
lawful arrest. As has been noted, waiver must be voluntary. Since a dead
or unconscious person cannot consent or refuse a blood-alcohol test, it is
difficult to see how they can be deemed not to have withdrawn consent.
Even if the tests are considered searches incident to a lawful arrest, it is
difficult to justify clauses such as § 11-501.1(b) since a lawful arrest cannot
be made on a dead or unconscious person.
77. P.A. No. 82-311, ch. 95 1/2, § 11-501.1 (1981).
78. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 11-501.1(a) (3) (1979).
79. The court granted certiorari in Washington v. Fitzsimmons, 449 U.S.
977 (1980), but failed to reach the question whether the right to counsel was
required immediately upon arrest under an implied consent statute. It vacated the judgment on the ground that it was unable to determine whether
the state decision was based on state or federal constitutional grounds, or
both.
The state court had held that an indigent drunk driver must be provided access to counsel promptly upon his arrest. State v. Fitzsimmons, 93
Wash. 2d 436, 610 P.2d 893 (1980). The Washington court followed its earlier
decision in Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 733, 409 P.2d 867 (1966), where it
was held that a person arrested for drunk driving immediately faces a critical stage of the proceeding because evidence of sobriety may be obtained
for only a short time after arrest. State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d at 44243, 610 P.2d at 897.
80. The trend has been to extend the right to counsel well beyond the
right to counsel at trial. The concept of counsel being required at critical
stages of prosecution is now the norm. The decision whether to submit to a
blood alcohol test must be deemed a critical stage in an implied consent
prosecution. The evidence obtained at this stage may be all that is necessary to convict a driver under the statute. Thus, the blood alcohol test becomes the focal point of the entire prosecution. The weighing of all of the
consequences of refusal versus non-refusal is thus critical and merits the
right to counsel.
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The right to counsel has been expanded beyond the right to
counsel at trial.81 Today, the right to counsel during a critical
stage of prosecution, 82 preindictment situations, 83 verbal self-incrimination, and nonverbal matters such as participation in lineups,84 is recognized and protected. In Gerstein v. Pugh,85 the
Supreme Court identified what constitutes a critical stage:
"those pre-trial procedures that would impair defense on the
merits if the accused is required to proceed without counsel. ' 86
Certainly the decision whether to consent to a blood alcohol test
87
would be considered a critical stage under this interpretation.
If the Supreme Court does make such a finding it will not
directly impair the Illinois statute. The statute itself does not
deny counsel. Police agencies should be forewarned, however,
that the new statute's deletion of the 90 minute waiting period
does not mean that counsel cannot be contacted by the accused
driver. A denial of a request to contact an attorney may result in
an exclusion of any blood-alcohol evidence obtained.
Admission of Evidence of Refusal
The final major change in the new Illinois statute concerns
the use of evidence of a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test.
While there is clear authority that the taking of a blood alcohol
test is not self-incrimination under the United States Constitution,88 case law is not so clear with regard to the use of evidence
81. See e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to counsel at
custodial interrogation); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to
counsel prior to indictment); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)
(right to counsel in preparation for trial); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52
(1961) (right to counsel at arraignment).
82. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), where the Court found
a right to counsel existed at a crucial stage of prosecution. In this case,
arraignment was found to be a critical stage since it was a point where valuable defenses could be lost if the accused were not given benefit of counsel.
83. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (the accused must be provided counsel whenever the police process shifts from investigatory to
accusatory).

84. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (the line-up is a critical
stage and the accused has a right to counsel since absence of counsel may
derrogate the accused's right to a fair trial).
85. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).

86. Id. at 122 (citations omitted).
87. Since the results of a blood test can be the determining factor of
whether the accused is convicted, the testing itself can hardly be deemed
less than a critical stage of prosecution.
For a further discussion of "critical stage" analysis, see Note, Driving
While Intoxicated and the Right to Counsel: The CaseAgainst Implied Con-

sent, 58 TEx. L. REv. 935 (1980).
88. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (the fifth amendment

protects only against being compelled to testify or give oral evidence

against oneself).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 15:479

of a refusal. A refusal usually requires a verbal statement.8 9
Since the purpose of using evidence of a refusal at any but a
presuspension hearing is to create an inference that the accused
knew he was drunk and so refused to allow confirmation by testing, the verbal refusal appears to act as self-incrimination.
A majority of courts, however, have held that evidence of a
driver's refusal to be tested is an admissible nontestimonial
act. 90 The reason for the holdings have varied. The Second Circuit reasoned that the state could condition the right to refuse
on admission of the refusal into evidence. 91 Other courts have
held that the implied consent statutes do not extend a right to
refuse, but merely recognize the power
to refuse so that admis92
sion of the evidence is not precluded.
Other jurisdictions, however, have found that submission of
a refusal into evidence violated the fifth amendment. 93 In
Schmerber, the Supreme Court warned that its holding did not
render admissible statements made by defendants in response
to police attempts to secure chemical tests. 94 Decisions which
find submission of evidence of a refusal violative of the fifth
amendment see such communications as just the type of state95
ments referred to in Schmerber.
The Supreme Court has refused to review this area. 96 An
analogy to decisions based on the admittance of evidence of re89. Johnson v. Dennis, 187 N.W.2d 605 (Neb. 1971) (a refusal may also be
made by total silence upon the request to submit to testing).
90. See, e.g., Welch v. District Court, 594 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1979) (right of
refusal conditioned on state's correlative right to introduce evidence of that
refusal); Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971) (refusal to submit is not testimonial communication and comment on refusal
does not violate right against self-incrimination).
91. Welch v. District Court, 594 F.2d 903, 905 (2d Cir. 1979). See also
State v. Brean, 136 Vt. 147, 385 A.2d 1085 (1978) (right to refuse is a matter of
legislative grace so the right can properly be conditioned on use of a refusal
as evidence).
92. See, e.g., Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685
(1971) (where no statutory right to refuse a test exists, comment on such
refusal is admissable evidence).
93. See Johnson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 607, 188 S.E.2d 416 (1972) (introduction of evidence of refusal is reversible error); State v. Andrews, 297
Minn. 260, 212 N.W.2d 863 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) (admission
of evidence which permits a jury to infer that a defendant had refused to
submit to chemical testing constitutes prejudicial error); Dudley v. State,
548 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Crim. 1977) (fifth amendment principles including Miranda apply to proof of a refusal to be tested).
94. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.757 (1966).
95. E.g., Dudley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Crim. 1977) (any communication which involves accused's consciousness of facts and operations of
his mind in expressing it is testimonial and communicative in nature).
96. Thomas v. New York, 444 U.S. 891 (1979), dismissing appealfrom 46
N.Y.2d 100, 385 N.E.2d 584, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1978) (White & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting); State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 212 N.W.2d 863 (1973), cert. de-
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fusal to give other forms of nontestimonial evidence can be
made. The trend of the majority permits the admittance of the
refusal as evidence. 97 Given this trend, the Illinois implied con98
sent statute should survive Supreme Court scrutiny.
CONCLUSION

The original Illinois implied consent statute admirably contained numerous provisions to protect the rights of the accused
driver. This is evidenced by the fact that no serious constitutional attacks were made on the statute. 99 Although the new Illinois statute has deleted many of the affirmative protections of
the accused's rights, it has adopted the structure of other constitutional statutes in neighboring states.
There are a number of provisions which may be problematic, requiring alteration of the new Illinois statute: the question
of self-incrimination rights under the Illinois Constitution; the
right to counsel; and whether evidence of a refusal to be tested
will be admissible under the fifth amendment. These three areas are likely to be the targets of early attacks on the new
statute.
nied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).

See supra note 78 for other areas where the

Supreme Court has refused review.
97. See supra note 88.

98. Should the Supreme Court encounter this issue, it will be faced with
two theories. First, the position taken by the majority of courts is that the
act of refusing or not refusing is merely a part of a process which does not
fall under filfth amendment protections. Since the testing procedure itself is
not encompassed by the fifth amendment, evidence as to what occurs during the procedure, including evidence of verbal statements of refusal is admissible. Second, the theory taken by some courts is that although the
procedure of blood-alcohol testing is not protected by the fifth amendment
since it is a non-communicative process, refusal to be tested is a communication which should be protected under the fifth amendment. Although the
majority of courts adhere to the first theory, prosecutors must not forget the
Supreme Court's dictum in Schmerber regarding statements made by defendants in response to police attempts to secure tests. The real question
will be whether the Supreme Court will follow the majority trend, distinguishing its remarks in Schmerber, or whether it will reiterate its Schmerber
remarks and apply them specifically to the refusal to submit.
99. In fact, the most serious constitutional threat that the implied consent statute faced was not a direct attack on the statute but an attack on the
Secretary of State's power to suspend or revoke a license or permit under
ILL. REV. STAT. ch 95 1/2, § 6-206(a) (1979). The United States Supreme
Court, in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977), upheld the Illinois practice of
suspending or revoking a license without a preliminary hearing. The Court
held that since the law also required that a hearing be provided to the licensee if he so requested, due process was not violated. Since the structure of
the implied consent statute was similar to the revocation statute with regard to the suspension of a license for refusal to be tested, this case, though
not a direct attack on implied consent, has strong implications for the validity of the implied consent statute.
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The deletion of many of the provisions of the original implied consent statute does not render the new statute either useless or unconstitutional. First, from an enforcement standpoint,
the new law is substantially workable. 10 0 The difficulties in implementing the old statute led to ineffective results and cries for
change. 1 1 Since the new statute is easier to use, arrests for
DWI should increase. An increase in the number of arrests is
100. Because the new statute deletes the 90 minute waiting period before
a blood-alcohol test can be taken and requires only one test to be performed
instead of two, the time required for making a DWI arrest is greatly reduced. This may have a dual affect. First, smaller law enforcement agencies that have not been able to afford the time necessary to make a DWI
arrest are more likely to use the new law. Second, where an agency might
have had time to make only one DWI arrest during a particular tour of duty,
it may now be able to make multiple arrests.
The deletion of the second test makes the new statute more workable in
another context. Under the old statute, the breathalizer was used. An arrestee was able to see the results of his first test immediately. For the testing to be admissable as evidence of the accused's intoxication, both tests
had to be performed. Therefore, an accused drunk driver could see the results of his first test and then either consent or refuse to take the second
test based on the first test's results. This meant that many refusals came
after the first test. Because evidence of the results of the blood-alcohol test
is important to the obtaining of a conviction, many convictions were lost.
The new statute is thus more workable in the area of obtaining convictions.
101. In 1969 there were 297,268 arrests for drunk driving nationwide. By
1980 that number had risen to over one million. United States Dept. of Justice, 1980 Sourcebook. In 1976, there were a total of 39,452 fatal motor accidents nationwide. Of the driver's in those accidents 13,446 were tested for
blood-alcohol concentrations (BAC). United States Dept. of Trans., Fatal
Accident Reporting System: 1976 Annual Report at 3, 88. Out of this
number 603 drivers were from Illinois. Over 57% of the Illinois drivers
tested above the .10% BAC level. Id. In 1979, 679 drivers killed in Illinois
were tested for BAC levels. Of these, 54% tested above the .10% BAC level.
Illinois Dept. of Trans., 1979 Accident Facts at 2, 13. Since the 1976 figures
included drivers who were killed, injured, or not harmed, and the 1979
figures were only for drivers killed, it is fair to speculate that were the additional statistics included in the 1979 figures they would show alcohol played
a part in well over 54% of Illinois accidents. Because the purpose of the
Illinois implied consent statute was to reduce the number of drunk drivers
and thus the number of alcohol related accidents, it is clear that the Illinois
statute has not been effective.
Further evidence of the ineffectiveness of the old statute is illustrated
by the fact that in 1971, the year prior to the enactment of the implied consent statute, there were 15,000 convictions for drunk driving in Illinois. By
1979 that number had dropped to 9,000. At the same time, the number of
licensed drivers had increased by 17%. In the City of Chicago, arrests
dropped from 14,179 in 1972 to 4,611 in 1979. The conviction rate dropped by
more than 50%. See The Chicago Tribune, January 4, 1981, at 12, col. 1.
While there was a drop in convictions there was an increase in the number
of refusals to be tested for blood-alcohol. This number went from 21% of all
arrests in 1972 to 47% in 1979. Id.
On a nationwide basis, there has been a steady increase in the number
of DWI arrests since implied consent statutes were first required. See
United States Department of Justice, Crime in the United States, 1976-1980;
United States Dept. of Justice, 1980 Sourcebook.
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02
the first step in making this new statute effective.'
The second step in making this new statute successful is to
ensure that the arresting agencies and the courts apply the
sanctions set forth in the statute itself.' 0 3 There is a minimal
deterrent factor if an accused knows he will be able to escape
the full consequences of his drunk driving, but he is very likely
to think twice about driving drunk if he knows he can feel the
04
full impact of the implied consent sanctions.

The ingredients of a successful statute, including ease of application and strong sanctions, are found within the four corners
of the new statute. If properly used by law enforcement agencies and courts, the new statute has a high probability of being
successful in removing drunk drivers from Illinois highways.
This will reduce the number of motor vehicle fatalities and injuries, benefitting all who venture out on our roadways. With this
new statute, the innocent motorist or pedestrian will be safer in
his travels.
Katharine Hill
102. The changes which have been made in the Illinois implied consent
statute have been demanded for some time. See Syer, The Illinois Implied
Consent Law: Reality and Reform, 63 ILL. BAR J. 276 (1979). See also The
Chicago Tribune, January 4, 1981, at 1. Other commentators, however,
would do away with implied consent entirely. See generally Note, Driving
While Intoxicatedand the Right to Counsel: The Case Against Implied Consent, 58 TEx. L. REv. 935 (1980).
Additionally, although the need for only one chemical analysis of bloodalcohol concentrations has long been espoused, there is some evidence that
such tests are inherently invalid. For a further discussion of this aspect, see
E. Fitzgerald &D. Hume, The Single Chemical Testfor Intoxication. A Challenge to Admissibility, 1981 MAss. L. REv. 23.
103. P.A. No. 82-311, ch. 95 1/2, §§ 11-501(c)--11-501.1(c). If convicted of
drunk driving, the driving privileges of the driver are to be revoked. Additionally, the offense of drunk driving is a Class A misdemeanor with a possible sentence of up to one year in jail. The penalties for refusal to be tested
have been increased to a six month suspension for a first refusal and a one
year suspension for a subsequent refusal within five years.
104. Both plea bargaining and court supervision are regularly used in
DWI cases. Although these remedies are normally appropriate in other facets of the law, over use in DWI cases make implied consent useless as a
deterrent. In both situations a drunk driver is able to leave the courtroom
without any evidence of a DWI arrest on his record. Consequently, the
drunk driver can be arrested time and time again without being held to the
stricter penalties allowed for repeat offenders. The repeat offender becomes aware that he will not have to face the full consequences of his violation and thus drives drunk again. Therefore, the whole purpose of the
statute is defeated.
An important result of drunk driving arrests is the identification of serious problem drinkers. For this portion of the drunk driving population, the
sanctions provided in P.A. No. 82-311 are not enough. In these situations,
other referral programs are necessary. For an outline of Illinois referral
programs for the problem drinker, see Illinois Dept. of Trans., Illinois Alcohol CountermeasuresProgram DWI Court Referral Projects, (1974).

